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The state-of-the-art Oxygen Generation Assembly (OGA) has been reliably producing 
breathing oxygen for the crew aboard the International Space Station (ISS) for over eight 
years.  Lessons learned from operating the ISS OGA have led to proposing incremental 
improvements to advance the baseline design for use in a future long duration mission.  
These improvements are intended to reduce system weight, crew maintenance time and 
resupply mass from Earth while increasing reliability.  The proposed improvements include 
replacing the cell stack membrane material, deleting the nitrogen purge equipment, 
replacing the hydrogen sensors, deleting the wastewater interface, replacing the hydrogen 
dome and redesigning the cell stack power supply.  The development work to date will be 
discussed and forward work will be outlined.  Additionally, a redesigned system architecture 
will be proposed. 
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I. History of the ISS OGA 
FTER more than a decade of development, the U.S. Regenerative (Regen) Environmental Control and Life 
Support Systems’ (ECLSS) Oxygen Generation System (OGS) rack delivery was accelerated, and it was 
launched within the Shuttle cargo bay to the International Space Station (ISS) in July 2006 and installed in the US 
Laboratory (Lab) Module.  The integrated Regen ECLSS three rack systems (see diagram in Figure 1) also include 
the Water Recovery System, 
comprised of the Water Processor 
Assembly (WPA) and the Urine 
Processor Assembly (UPA) which 
launched later in 2008 and together, 
enabled the ISS to expand its crew size 
from three to six crewmembers. 
All three Regen ECLSS racks were 
originally intended to be installed in 
ISS Node 3, but the ISS program 
management desired an early check-
out of Regen systems within US Lab 
prior to the Node 3 launch on Shuttle 
flight 20A.  Regen rack modification 
kits were launched and installed within 
the US Lab in 2007 to provide the 
Regen systems’ power, data, coolant, 
nitrogen, water, and space vacuum 
interfaces. The Regen ECLSS racks 
were subsequently relocated from the US Lab to Node 3 in February 2010.  
The UPA distills the collected urine to evaporate and extract the water, which is fed into the WPA.  The WPA 
combines the distillate with the humidity condensate collected from the ISS air conditioners into a waste water 
accumulator. The WPA system then purifies the waste water through resin based Multi Filtration Beds, Particulate 
Filters and a Catalytic Reactor before passing the recycled purified water through an Ion Exchange resin bed to 
release low levels of iodine as a microbial growth inhibitor.  The WPA potable water is stored within an 
accumulator.  The WPA provides potable water to the crew for consumption and the OGS for electrolysis.  
The OGS rack (see Figure 4) includes the Oxygen Generation Assembly (OGA), Sabatier Carbon Dioxide 
Reduction Assembly (Sabatier CRA), the Power Supply Module (PSM), Avionics Air Assembly, Remote Power 
Controller Module, Rack Smoke Detector, Rack Power Switch, coldplates, flexhoses, power / data cabling, acoustic 
foam, and rack structure.  The Sabatier CRA was launched separately and integrated into the OGS rack October 
2010.  The OGA utilizes cathode feed electrolysis to produce both oxygen for the crew to breathe, and hydrogen 
which is sent to the Sabatier CRA or optionally, out through the vent to space vacuum.   
The Sabatier CRA utilizes a heated, catalyst reactor bed to combine hydrogen from the OGA and compressed 
carbon dioxide from the ISS Node 3 Carbon Dioxide Removal Assembly (CDRA) to produce water and methane. 
The separated methane gas is vented into space through the shared, OGA hydrogen / nitrogen sub-ambient vent line 
while the water is fed into the ISS wastewater bus for reprocessing through the WPA.  The OGS rack contains 
accumulator tanks for compressed carbon dioxide storage.  As of February 22, 2015 the Sabatier CRA has reclaimed 
over 1,000 lbm of water. 
After a year of early checkout, the OGA was first activated for electrolysis in July 2007 by utilizing a temporary 
rack mounted Water Delivery System which pumped feedwater to the OGA from Payload Water Reservoirs 
containing shuttle fuel cell water.   After the WPA and ISS Potable Water Bus were made operational in 2008, the 
OGS received Feedwater from the ISS potable bus and no longer required the WDS which was dismantled and 
stowed. 
 
II. Description of the ISS OGA 
As of March 1, 2015, the OGA has produced over 8200 lbm of oxygen and 1000 lbm of hydrogen.  The OGA 
cell stack has accumulated a total operating time of 31,980 hours (including 133 hours of ground testing).  See 
Figure 2 for a plot of oxygen produced over time. 
A 
Figure 1 - ISS US Regen ECLSS Diagram. 
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A simplified schematic of the OGA is shown in Figure 3.  Feed water from the ISS potable water bus enters the 
assembly through the Water Assembly Orbital Replacement Unit (ORU) and flows through an Inlet Deionizing Bed, 
which serves as an iodine remover and as a coalescer for any gas bubbles that may be present in the feedwater.  If 
gas bubbles are detected by the gas sensor 
downstream of the DI bed, the feedwater is rejected 
by a three-way valve to the waste water bus. This 
serves to prevent any oxygen that may be present in 
the feedwater from mixing with the generated 
hydrogen. Water is electrolyzed into oxygen and 
hydrogen in the Hydrogen Dome ORU, which 
contains the electrolysis cell stack, sensors, valves 
and a Rotary Separator Accumulator (RSA).  The 
RSA separates the cathode side product gaseous 
hydrogen from the water which is recirculated by 
the positive displacement Pump ORU.  The 
hydrogen dome provides a multiple leakage barrier 
protection in the event of a failure.  The hydrogen 
dome is maintained at low pressure by venting to 
space vacuum.  Separated hydrogen gas is sent 
either to the Sabatier CRA or optionally out to space through the vacuum vent.  Oxygen produced by the cell stack 
passes through the Oxygen Outlet ORU containing a water absorber, which protects the downstream hydrogen 
sensors from liquid moisture.  The Hydrogen Sensor ORU monitors the product oxygen for the presence of 
hydrogen, which would indicate leakage within the cell stack and signal the OGA Process Controller to quickly shut 
down the OGA. The Nitrogen Purge ORU stores a pressurized volume of nitrogen gas from the ISS distribution line 
to purge the OGA cell stack upon shutdowns.  Nitrogen is utilized to mitigate the safety hazards associated with the 
mixing of oxygen and hydrogen within the cell stack or the dome. The nitrogen can also be used to inert the dome 
environment during extended periods of non-operation.  The Process Controller ORU is responsible for OGA 
system command/control and communication with the ISS.  The OGA sensors are used for fault detection and fault 
isolation purposes. In addition, sensor data can be used to indicate that an ORU should be scheduled for changed-out 
with a pre-positioned, on-orbit spare ORU.  The PSM ORU provides power to the OGA electrolysis cell stack.  The 
PSM ORU provides 10-55 amps of current to the OGA cell stack during Process mode and 1.0 amps during Standby 
mode (2% oxygen production rate). The PSM is designed for 60,000 process/standby cycles, and a 10-year life. 
 
Figure 3 - OGA Simplified Schematic. 
 
Figure 2 - Total Oxygen Produced by the OGA. 
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The OGA is designed to generate oxygen at a nominal rate of 5.4 kg/day (12 lbm/day) when operated on 
day/night orbital cycles (53 minutes at 100% production, 37 minutes in standby which produces 0.44 lbm/day of 
oxygen), and also at a selectable rate between 2.3 and 9.2 kg/day (5.1 and 20.4 lbm/day) or 22 to 100% oxygen 
production rate when operated continuously. At the nominal rate, the OGA can support oxygen needs for 4 crew, 
biological specimens, and atmosphere leakage, while at the maximum rate it can support 7 crew, biological 
specimens, and atmosphere leakage.  The product oxygen meets quality specifications for temperature, free water, 
dew point, and hydrogen content.  The OGA is packaged into eight ORUs, residing in the OGS rack.  Most of the 
OGA ORUs are run to failure except for the calibration life limited Hydrogen Sensor ORU and the mixed-resin 
containing ORUs (Inlet DI Bed and ACTEX) which are trended for water throughput and return water quality to 
determine the Preventative Maintenance (PM) replacement intervals. 
  
Figure 4 – OGS Rack. 
 
III. Lessons Learned from ISS OGA 
The OGS has been on-orbit for over 8 years.  Significant lessons have been learned through OGS operational 
experiences, both nominal and off-nominal workarounds.  Figures 5 and 6 detail significant OGA events. 
The major lesson learned is to have a mixed resin deionization bed always installed within the OGA water 
recirculation loop to maintain near neutral pH and minimize corrosion product contamination and maximize cell 
stack life.  The OGA was initially launched without a deionization bed.  After the cell stack failure (described in 
later in this section), a deionization bed was retrofitted in the recirculation loop in 2011. 
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Monitoring the health of 
the dead-ended OGA 
recirculation water loop for 
any increasing concentration 
of anionic and cationic 
chemical species including 
Total Organic Carbon (TOC) 
is key to gaining an early 
warning insight to potential 
poisoning of the Membrane 
Electrode Assemblies 
(MEAs) within the cell stack.  
The OGA team conducts 
periodic cell stack 
polarization scans, which 
step-up the current density to 
the cell stack membranes and 
plot the corresponding 
voltage to determine if any 
curve shifts are evident at the 
highest production rates 
which is indicative of contamination within the MEAs. 
Recirculation loop water samples are periodically returned to the ground for chemical, particulate and microbial 
analysis.  From this analysis the team determines when TOC remediation should be implemented to avoid risk of 
irreversible contamination damage to the MEAs, confirms loop pH is near neutral, ensures no flow channel bypass, 
validates effective ion exchange, monitors non-ionic loading and identifies microbial counts/species to quantify risk 
for biofouling. 
A new capability to periodically refresh the recirculation loop water would automatically lower any increasing 
TOC contaminant concentrations.  To retrofit this feature into the ISS OGA on-orbit would require significant cost 
to redesign and reanalysis of safety hazards.  In 2015, the OGA team is planning to ground test a rack mounted 
effluent bag which will 
allow for a one liter per 
hour maximum bleed off of 
the recirculation loop water 
while the OGA is in 
Standby.  This bleed 
procedure will safely 
remove approximately 80% 
of ionic contaminants from 
the recirculation loop over 
a 40 hour period. 
There should be 
improvements to system 
and ORU reliability which 
would result in decreased 
crew time for PM 
replacements and a 
reduction in logistics 
requirements.  An example 
is the limited calibration 
life of the Hydrogen Sensor 
ORU resulting in replacement and dry oxygen purge every 150 operational days.  Once removed, the sensor must be 
returned to the ground for recalibration.  There are seventeen Hydrogen Sensor ORUs within the fleet to allow for a 
minimum of three on-orbit prepositioned spares and to ensure adequate lead times for ground recalibrations and 
processing for loading on launch vehicles.  Alternative technologies for hydrogen detection may not be susceptible 
Figure 5 - OGA History of Major Events 7/2006 - 4/2012. 
Figure 6 - OGA History of Major Events 5/2012 - 11/2014. 
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to sensor drift, calibration life limitations, and could be a run to failure ORU which would eliminate the need for PM 
replacements. 
During OGA failure troubleshooting or attempts to implement workarounds to regain system functionality, the 
team is limited by the OGA Independent Shutdown Monitor (ISM) hard-wired function that can not be disabled or 
overridden to new limits.  The OGA ISM function provides automatic, hard-wired limit protection from system 
hazards by the removal of power to all system effectors.  The ISM function is implemented with hardware which is 
fully independent of the OGA Process Controller software.  There could be more operational flexibility if the ISM 
function could be disabled temporarily. 
Another significant lesson learned is to minimize the use of filters within any future system and locate them such 
that they are easily inspected and replaceable or cleaned.  Typical OGA ORUs with imbedded filters require the 
replacement of the entire ORU if a filter becomes occluded. 
The OGA Hydrogen Dome Assembly ORU cannot be disassembled on-orbit by the crew to perform 
maintenance on the internal components (cell stack, RSA, valves, and sensors).  The large stainless steel dome 
covering the ORU as fracture control protection is not removable by the crew.  Future system redesigns should 
attempt to employ alternative hazard controls and methods that could eliminate the need for a dome. 
It would be desirable to design thermal expansion capability into all water filled ORUs and to use only fluid 
flexhose types that can adequately accommodate water expansion due temperature increases.  This capability is 
required when ORUs and flex hoses are disconnected for maintenance. On ISS, additional crew time must be used to 
find and install compatible thermal expansion devices to preclude exceeding Maximum Design Pressure (MDP) 
limits of the hardware. 
The ability to disable keying of the fluid Quick Disconnects (QDs) will allow for more flexibility when the crew 
needs to respond to on-orbit OGS contingency cases. 
 
A. Cell Stack Failure in 2010 
On July 5, 2010, after approximately 233 days of cumulative operation, the first installed OGA Hydrogen Dome 
ORU’s cell stack had a high voltage failure.  The ORU rated life is five years.  The ORU was replaced with an on-
orbit spare and the failed ORU was returned in March 2011 to the ground for failure investigation.  Prior to the ORU 
failure, the upstream recirculation loop filters were clogging.  In addition, analysis determined that the filters were 
partially loaded with metallic corrosion products and the recirculation loop water pH was 4.1.  The desired 
recirculation loop pH level is between 6 to 7.  At the time of the high voltage cell stack failure it was unclear what, if 
any, relationship existed between the recirculation loop high delta pressure, low pH of the returned water samples 
and the cell stack’s high voltage failure. Initially, the team believed blockage of cell stack water flow passages 
caused water starvation resulting in an increase in cell resistance and voltage. 
Hardware tear-down after the failure showed no evidence of restrictions within the cell stack water flow 
passages.  Published literature for fuel cell technology identified that there is a known chemical degradation of the 
cell membrane polymer chain end groups during normal operation.  In the case of cathode feed electrolysis, this 
degradation resulted in the formation and release of hydrofluoric and sulfuric acid into the recirculation loop water 
on the cathode side of the cell.  This lowered the recirculation loop water pH to the point of corroding the normally 
corrosion resistant metals in the wetted loop. These corrosion products became the source of cations that 
contaminated the cell membranes.  This reduced the water transport and proton conductivity of the cell membranes 
resulting in a rapid increase in cell resistance driving the voltage up to the high shutdown limit. 
The original design of OGA included a recirculation loop deionization bed, but it was eliminated due to safety 
concerns of hydrogen gas build-up within it.  The OGA was launched in 2006 without a deionization bed in the 
recirculation loop.   The crew installed a mixed resin deionization bed (ACTEX) in the recirculation loop on 
5/26/2011 as recurrence control.  Subsequently, the recirculation loop pH returned to near neutral pH values. This 
bed removes the electrolysis generated acid, balances the pH & removes cationic contaminants responsible for 
accelerated membrane degradation.  The OGA team instituted periodic polarization scans and recirculation loop 
water samples. The team recommended using long term Standby instead of Shutdown (to maintains loop water 
recirculation through the ACTEX).  If shutdown of the OGA is necessary then use of a newly developed cell 
discharge procedure is required to ensure most reactants are recombined locally at the cell membranes to minimize 
zones of low pH. 
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B. Hydrogen Sensor Drift 
The OGA is required to be 
two fault tolerant to preventing 
a cell stack hydrogen leak into 
the oxygen delivery line from 
creating a catastrophic hazard 
(e.g. hazardous hydrogen 
release to ISS cabin).  To meet 
this safety requirement, the 
three hydrogen sensors must 
provide two independent means 
for detecting hydrogen and 
shutting down the OGA system 
after a cell stack hydrogen 
leakage failure.  Upon an OGA 
shutdown, redundant oxygen 
isolation valves close to prevent 
a hazardous hydrogen release to 
the ISS cabin.  The hydrogen 
sensors are required to be one 
fault tolerant to detecting a fault 
and shutting down the OGA 
system. 
The Hydrogen Sensor ORU consists of three separate sensors dies. The current sensor calibration life is 150 days 
of “powered-on” time. Exposure of the dies to hydrogen gas changes the electrical output of the circuit in proportion 
to the partial pressure of hydrogen in the gas phase.  
Five of the last ten installed Hydrogen Sensor ORUs have exhibited an unexplained, upwards drift (conservative 
direction towards high shutdown limit) in at least one of three sensor channels, requiring a ground commanded 
inhibit of that sensor to prevent system shutdown (see Figure 7).  Sensors that exhibit this drift are diverging and 
rising upwards at different rates.  Flight rules were established to inhibit a high drifting sensor when it exceeds the 
other two sensors within the ORU by 280 Pascals, and the remaining two are below 250 Pascals and also above -30 
Pascals.  The Flight rule ensures only one sensor is failed and the remaining two sensors are credible. 
Sensor output increases (conservative direction towards high shutdown limit) as inert nitrogen gas displaces 
oxygen at the sensor’s active sites.  During a normal shutdown or a nitrogen purge, the oxygen (anode) side of the 
cell stack is filled with nitrogen.  Upon restart, the nitrogen is pushed out to the hydrogen sensors and a temporary 
biasing of the sensors occurs.  The hydrogen sensors recover to their normal values after oxygen is being produced 
and the nitrogen is purged from the line out to the ISS cabin. 
There are both known and unknown cross-contaminant chemical species that can influence the sensor’s electrical 
output.  Sensor output is depressed by increasing amounts of water vapor and was quantified in sensor qualification 
life testing on nine sensor dies. Humidity is compensated for in the sensor’s ground calibration. 
If a powered sensor die were to be exposed to liquid water, electrolysis reactions can occur on the die surfaces, 
causing destructive loss of the sensor’s functionality. To protect against this occurrence, die surface temperatures are 
maintained above the gas-phase dew point via local heaters whenever the OGA is powered.  In the event that the 
system is unpowered, residual water vapor within the hydrogen sensor manifold can condense as internal ORU 
temperatures drop to cabin ambient.  If the hydrogen sensor were to be re-powered with condensed water on the 
dies, damaging electrolysis reactions may occur and result in a shift in sensor output voltage. In order to preclude 
such an occurrence during either planned or unplanned OGA shutdowns, the crew is required to perform a dry 
oxygen purge of Hydrogen Sensor ORU.  The crew uses ISS oxygen distribution lines connected to a Portable 
Breathing Apparatus hose and the Hydrogen Sensor ORU Purge Adaptor, to purge residual water vapor from the 
hydrogen sensor manifold.  After the purge, the hydrogen sensor will be left in a dry condition from which it can 
safely be re-powered. 
The OGA team believes the increasing response trend is due to a sensor drift issue (unknown cause) and is not 
due to incipient cell stack hydrogen leakage (from the cathode side across the cell membrane(s) to the oxygen anode 
side) for the following reasons:   a) Periodic cell stack polarization scans indicate nominal voltage values for each 5 
amp step increase in current, indicating a healthy cell stack with no cross-cell leakage. Any H2 leakage to the anode 
side would recombine with oxygen in the presence of catalyst and cause cell voltage increases.  b) When the OGA 
Figure 7 - Drifting Sensors Requiring Flight Rule Inhibits. 
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has remained in long term Standby with mostly water in the two-phase cathode side recirculation loop, no RSA 
water quantity decreases have been detected.  c)  Common occurrence since drift has been seen on at least half of the 
ORUs installed on-orbit with typically one sensor drifting upwards more rapidly than the other two. 
C. Need for Day/Night Cycling 
Given that the OGA is one of the major ISS power draws, there were initially constraints to its operations while 
ISS was power limited, prior to assembly complete.  The OGA is designed to operate on day/night orbital cycles (53 
minutes at 100% production, 37 minutes while in Standby) to minimize power consumption and battery draw during 
night portions of the ISS orbit.  The OGA total maximum steady-state power consumption while in process mode is 
3955 W.  In Standby, the total maximum steady-state power consumption is 497 W.  The ISS electrical system uses 
eight Solar Array Wings to directly convert sunlight to 120 volts DC electricity for equipment in the U.S. segment.  
The ISS power storage system consists of battery assemblies.  A fourth and final set of solar arrays and batteries 
arrived in March in 2009 and allowed for continuous OGS oxygen production without having to employ the power 
saving day / night cycling.  Since then, there has been minimal day / night cycling operations. 
IV. Requirements for a Long Duration Exploration Mission 
A future OGA system for exploration should logically be based on the state of the art (SOA) ISS OGA.  Since 
the ISS OGA has proven to be extremely safe and reliable over eight years of operation, it will provide an excellent 
foundation for the design of a future system.  However, certain incremental improvements based on lessons learned  
should be considered.  These will aim to reduce system mass, improve reliability and reduce the need for logistics 
resupply. 
The general requirements for a future long duration exploration mission will likely be different from those that 
influenced the ISS OGA design.   ISS OGA was originally designed to support a crew of 6 and a compliment of 
research laboratory animals.  In addition, oxygen generation was constrained to only the daylight portion of the 
orbit.  Therefore, the ISS OGA maximum production rate was required to be 20.4 lb/day.  ISS benefits from frequent 
logistics resupply missions to provide spare parts to replace failed components. 
Future exploration missions are expected to include 4 crewmembers and continuous power availability is 
assumed.  Also, extravehicular activities (EVA’s) are expected to be infrequent.  Therefore, a much lower maximum 
oxygen production rate is envisioned for a future exploration mission.  It is assumed that a future OGA system for 
exploration will only be required to generate 9.6 lb/day of oxygen, or less than half of the ISS OGA capability.  
Also, there are expected to be no (or very infrequent) logistics resupply missions. 
There are certain areas of the ISS OGA design which might be considered overly conservative, leading to 
increased system mass/complexity and reduced maintainability.  These areas of the design relate to managing 
hydrogen and oxygen.  Over the many years of operating the ISS OGA, valuable experience and understanding has 
been gained relating to the safe management of hydrogen and oxygen.  Through careful analysis and testing, some 
of the conservatism in the design can be reduced without adding appreciable risk.  The benefit will be decreased 
system mass, complexity and logistics resupply from Earth.  
V. Proposed Incremental Improvements 
 
Table 1 lists each of the proposed incremental improvements to the baseline design. 
 
Table 1. Proposed Improvements. 
Improvement Reason Description 
Cell stack membrane 
replacement 
SOA membrane is 
obsolete 
Replace obsolete Nafion membrane with 
chemically stabilized Nafion membrane 
Delete the nitrogen purge 
equipment 
Reduce system mass 
and complexity 
Delete nitrogen purging of the cell stack 
anode during shutdowns and startups 
Replace hydrogen sensors Reduce crew 
maintenance time 
Replace hydrogen sensors with a more 
reliable technology that requires less crew 
intervention 
Delete the wastewater 
interface 
Reduce system mass 
and complexity 
Allow oxygen gas that may be in the 
feedwater into the RSA rather than being 
rejected to the wastewater bus 
Replace the hydrogen dome Allow crew Baseline dome design does not allow 
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maintenance of cell 
stack and RSA 
crew access to the internal dome 
components for maintenance 
Downsize the PSM Reduce system 
mass/volume 
SOA PSM is oversized for a future 
mission 
 
The safety and operational implications of 
implementing the proposed upgrades will be carefully 
analyzed by the OGA Team in 2015.  The upgrades will 
be demonstrated on the developmental OGA (dev-OGA) 
located at NASA Marshall Space Flight Center.  The 
dev-OGA is functionally equivalent to the ISS OGA.  It 
contains a flight like cell stack, RSA, pump and PSM.  
Other components such as valves and sensors are 
commercial items.  A picture of the dev-OGA is shown 
in Figure 8.  Two of the proposed upgrades (nitrogen 
purge deletion and replacing the hydrogen sensors) have 
already been incorporated into the dev-OGA and over 
100 hours of safe operation have been demonstrated to 
date.  The rest of the upgrades will be incorporated into 
the dev-OGA in 2015.  Then the next logical step over 
the coming years will be to incorporate some of these 
upgrades into the ISS OGA and demonstrate safe 
operation in microgravity.   
D. Replacing the Cell Stack Membrane 
The ISS OGA cell stack is a cathode feed design, with 28 cells to 
electrolyze water to generate oxygen and hydrogen.  Each cell contains a 
cathode compartment and an anode compartment, separated by a Nafion 
membrane (manufactured by DuPont).  Thin layers of catalyst are applied on 
each side of the membrane to form the anode and cathode electrodes of the 
cell.  In this design, feed water is circulated on the cathode side of the cells, 
where hydrogen is generated.  Excess water carries away the produced 
hydrogen and process heat.  The membrane’s high water permeability allows 
sufficient water transport to the anode, where the electrolysis actually takes 
place.  Oxygen is generated at the anode, where it is virtually free of liquid 
water. 
The original Nafion membrane material used in the ISS OGA cell stack is 
obsolete.  DuPont now offers “chemically stabilized” Nafion, which has a 
much lower fluoride release rate. This chemically stabilized Nafion has not 
been incorporated into the ISS OGA cell stack or any 
spares.  Another consideration is that the ISS OGA cell 
stack vendor, United Technologies Aerospace Systems 
(UTAS), no longer manufactures cell stacks. 
The buildup of hydrofluoric acid within the 
recirculation loop was the cause of the ISS OGA cell 
stack failure in 2010.  Incorporating chemically 
stabilized Nafion, with its lower fluoride release rate, 
should improve system reliability. 
Thus, there is a need to qualify a new cell stack 
design from a new vendor now for future long duration 
missions.  This process involves three steps: 
 
- Build and endurance test newly designed single 
cells 
- Build and acceptance test a newly designed 28-
cell stack  
Figure 8 - Dev-OGA. 
Figure 9 - Single Cell with CS-Nafion. 
Figure 10 - Single Cell Test Stand. 
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- Integrate the new cell stack into the dev-OGA and verify system performance 
 
In 2014, NASA contracted with Giner, Inc. to build three single cells.  These single cells were of the same 
design as the ISS OGA cells (same physical dimensions, active area, and current density), except that the newer 
chemically stabilized Nafion was used for the membranes.   A single cell is shown in Figure 9. 
These single cells were operated in the same manner as is done on ISS: cathode water feed configuration and 
0.73 lb/day of ambient pressure oxygen production.   
The testing was configured as follows: 
 
-  The first cell was operated continuously for four 
months 
- The second cell was operated cyclically for four months 
(five days on, two days off, with shutdown nitrogen 
purging and shutdown cell discharging; as done on ISS) 
- The third cell was operated cyclically for ten months 
(five days on, two days off, without shutdown nitrogen 
purging or shutdown cell discharging) 
 
Figure 10 shows the test stand for one of the single cells.  
Essentially no cell voltage degradation (i.e. increase in cell 
voltage over time) was noted for any of the cells over the 
four month and ten month period.  Figure 11 shows the cell 
voltage of the third cell over a period of 10 months of 
operation. 
After all endurance testing was completed, the three 
single cell passed health checks, as shown in Table 2. 
 
 
 
Table 2 - Post-Endurance Test Health Check. Post	  Test	  Health	  Check	   Pass?	   Comment	  Polarization	  Scan	   Yes	   No	   indication	   of	   water	   transport	   limitation	   at	   maximum	  current	  density	  Resistance	  Measurement	   Yes	   No	  appreciable	  increase	  in	  resistance	  after	  endurance	  test	  Short	  Test	   Yes	   	  Cross	  Cell	  Leak	  Test	   Yes	   	  Overboard	  Leak	  Test	   Yes	   	  Oxygen	  Purity	   Yes	   0.01%	  H2	  detected	  Catalyst	  Shedding	   Yes	   Nearly	   undetectable	   amount	   of	   catalyst	   detected	   in	  downstream	  water	  filter	  
 
 
Based on these excellent single cell test results, a newly designed cell stack should meet or exceed the 5 year life 
of the heritage cell stack. 
A complete 28 cell stack with chemically stabilized Nafion membranes will be built in 2015.  The intent will be 
to build a “drop-in replacement” stack, compatible with the ISS OGA balance of plant.  The cell construction will be 
the same as the three single cells.  The non-repeating hardware (such as the end plates) will not be required to be the 
same as the heritage ISS design. Once the cell stack is assembled and passes acceptance testing, it will be delivered 
to NASA (expected in November 2015).  The new cell stack will be integrated into the dev-OGA at MSFC, and the 
long term performance of the new cell stack will be compared to the heritage OGA cell stack. 
 
E. Deleting the Nitrogen Purge Equipment 
The ISS OGA requires an external source of nitrogen, provided by the ISS 
vehicle.  The ISS OGA has approximately 50 lb of equipment to handle the storage 
Figure 11 - Cell Voltage Trend Over 10 
Months. 
Figure 12 - Nitrogen Purge of 
Anode. 
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and distribution of nitrogen.  Nitrogen is used for two purposes.  The first is to purge the cell stack anode upon 
system shutdown and startup (see Figure 12).   
During prolonged shutdowns, hydrogen in the cathode compartment will migrate through the membrane to the 
anode compartment, which contains oxygen.  A nitrogen purge will replace the oxygen with nitrogen, preventing a 
mixture of hydrogen and oxygen in the anode.  The second purpose is to fill the hydrogen dome prior to removal 
from the system with nitrogen to create an inert condition for transportation.  If the hydrogen dome is deleted, as 
proposed in this paper, the need for inerting the dome will be obviated. 
The benefit of deleting the nitrogen purging 
equipment is a reduction in system complexity and 
weight.  In addition, the vehicle design will be 
simplified since it will not be required to supply 
nitrogen to OGA. 
Deleting nitrogen purging during the shutdown 
process will mean that oxygen in the anode will not 
be removed.  It will also mean that the cathode 
pressure will be higher than the anode pressure, and 
that hydrogen will permeate through the membrane 
to the anode, where oxygen is.  The hydrogen and 
oxygen should safely combine to form water, in the 
presence of catalyst. 
Deleting nitrogen purging during the startup 
process will mean that any hydrogen that has 
permeated through the membrane during periods of 
dormancy could be vented out the oxygen outlet 
after startup.  However, if hydrogen and oxygen 
combine to form water, then there should be very little hydrogen exiting out the oxygen outlet. 
During the single cell testing (described in the previous section) at Giner, one of the cells was operated safely 
without any nitrogen purging for ten months.  No safety issues or change in functional performance occurred.  At 
UTAS, flight ISS OGA cell stacks are operated safely without nitrogen purging during ground testing.   
The dev-OGA was modified in Feb 2014 to operate without nitrogen purging of the anode during shutdown and 
startup.  To date, the dev-OGA has operated for 135 hours safely without any nitrogen purging. 
Figure 13 shows the cathode/hydrogen (red line) and anode/oxygen (blue line) pressure after a shutdown of the 
dev-OGA without performing a nitrogen purge.  
After about 12 hours it can be seen that both sides of 
the cells equalize fairly closely in pressure (within 1 
psi).  The decrease in hydrogen pressure (red line) 
indicates that hydrogen is permeating across the 
membrane from the cathode to the anode.  The 
initial decrease in oxygen pressure (blue line) to 
sub-ambient pressure (10.5 psia) indicates that 
hydrogen permeating across to the anode and safely 
combining with oxygen to form water and not 
creating a hazardous condition. 
Figure 14 shows the percent hydrogen present in 
the product oxygen (blue line) and the cell stack 
current (red line) during a startup without nitrogen 
purging.  Once oxygen production begins (cell stack 
current increases to 23 Amps), the percent hydrogen 
in the oxygen outlet rises to 0.3 – 0.35% (blue line), 
still well below the lower flammability limit (LFL) 
of 4.0%.  Table 3 shows the percent hydrogen in oxygen measured during other system startups without nitrogen 
purging.  In all cases, the percent hydrogen in oxygen at startup is well below the LFL. 
Figure 13 - Cathode and Anode Pressure After 
Shutdown. 
Figure 14 - Percent Hydrogen in Oxygen and Cell 
Stack Current on Startup. 
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Table 3 - Percent Hydrogen in Oxygen on Startup. Date	   Percent	   Hydrogen	   in	   Oxygen	  During	  Startup	   Comment	  2/25/14	   0.2%	   Startup	  after	  being	  shut	  down	  for	  1	  day	  3/3/14	   0.45%	   Startup	  after	  being	  shut	  down	  for	  3	  days	  6/26/14	   0.3%	   Startup	  after	  being	  shut	  down	  for	  112	  days	  7/1/14	   0.3%	   Startup	  after	  being	  shut	  down	  for	  5	  day	  
 
Safe operation of the dev-OGA without shutdown or startup nitrogen purging has been demonstrated in 2014.  
The dev-OGA will continue to be operated with nitrogen purging disabled in the future. 
When nitrogen purging is deleted, liquid water is present in the oxygen outlet during startup.  An average of 125 
mL of water is pushed out of the cell stack during each startup.  A method for handling this liquid water in 
microgravity will need to be implemented. 
One special case will need further analysis if nitrogen purging is deleted.  In the event of a cross cell leak failure, 
where hydrogen and water could enter into the anode, no nitrogen purging will occur at shutdown. 
F. Replacing the Hydrogen Sensors with a Recombiner 
The ISS OGA contains three independent hydrogen sensors to monitor 
for hydrogen in the product oxygen prior to being released into the ISS cabin 
atmosphere.  The process controller shuts down the OGA if any of the 
sensors detect more than one percent hydrogen in oxygen.  The presence of 
hydrogen in the product oxygen indicates a cross cell leak within the cell 
stack.  The hydrogen sensors are sensitive to moisture.  Condensation on the 
hydrogen sensor dies while being powered will cause permanent damage.  
To prevent condensation, heaters maintain the temperature above the dew 
point of the oxygen coming from the cell stack.  After every system 
shutdown, the crew must connect the hydrogen sensors to a dry oxygen 
source to remove condensation.  The hydrogen sensors must be returned to 
earth every 150 days for recalibration. 
A recombiner is proposed as a replacement to the existing hydrogen 
sensors in the oxygen outlet line.  A recombiner (aka catalytic reactor) is a 
simple device: a metal housing containing catalyst with integral 
thermocouples, as shown in Figure 15.  An external heater is wrapped around 
the housing to heat the catalyst, as shown in Figure 16.  This will always 
keep the catalyst temperature above the dew point of the incoming oxygen 
and prevent condensation on the catalyst.  Exposed, unsheathed thermocouples are used for fastest response. 
If hydrogen is present in the product oxygen stream, it will 
combine with the oxygen in the presence of the catalyst and release 
heat.  The integral thermocouples will detect a temperature increase 
and the system can be safely shutdown.  For adequate safety 
margin, 1% and greater hydrogen in oxygen will need to be 
detectable. 
There are several benefits to replacing the current hydrogen 
sensors with a recombiner.  The recombiner should be able to 
remain installed for years without the need for periodic removal and 
ground calibration.  It will not require dry oxygen purging by the 
crew after every system shutdown. 
Deactivation or poisoning of the catalyst is a long term concern 
which will require further investigation in 2015. 
A recombiner from Resource Systems, Inc. was tested under a range of conditions that would be seen in system 
operation: flow rates from 1.2 lpm to 4.5 lpm and dew points from 60 F to 85 F.  The hydrogen in oxygen 
concentration was varied from 0 – 3.5% to simulate a cross cell leak in the cell stack. 
Figure 15 - Recombiner Cross 
Section. 
Figure 16 - Recombiner with Heater. 
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The response of the recombiner to 3.5% 
hydrogen in oxygen is shown in Figure 17 for the 
case of 4.5 lpm flow and 85 F dew point.  In less 
than 10 seconds, a rapid increase in the inlet 
temperature (blue line) is seen.  OGA system 
software can be configured to immediately 
shutdown the system once a rapid temperature 
increase is detected.  Another positive point is that 
most of the hydrogen is removed by the 
recombiner. The measured amount of hydrogen in 
oxygen at the outlet (green line) is less than 0.5% 
(compared to 3.5% at the inlet).  Table 4 shows 
the time for the recombiner temperature to reach 
130 F with 3.5% hydrogen in oxygen input, at 
various flow rates and dew points. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 - Recombiner Response Time to 3.5% H2/O2. 	   60	  F	  dew	  point	   72.5	  F	  dew	  point	   85	  F	  dew	  point	  1.2	  lpm	  flow	   6	  s	   6	  s	   8	  s	  4.5	  lpm	  flow	   4	  s	   4	  s	   5	  s	  
 
If a shutdown limit of 130 F for the recombiner temperature is in place, then the system will be shut down in 8 
seconds or less in the event of a cross cell leak.  In all cases, the amount of hydrogen at the outlet is less than 0.5%.  
With a smaller cross cell leak, such as one resulting in 1% hydrogen in oxygen, the recombiner response time will 
be longer (on the order of 2 to 3 minutes), but should be acceptable since very little hydrogen allowed out to the 
cabin. 
G. Deleting the Wastewater Interface 
Feed water is batch supplied to the ISS OGA to replace water consumed by electrolysis.  Feed water flows 
through an inlet deionizing bed to remove iodine.  Oxygen in the feedwater can coalesce in the inlet deionizing bed 
and oxygen bubbles will be released periodically out of the bed.  Two gas sensors will detect this release and a 
three-way valve will divert the feed water to the wastewater bus and prevent oxygen gas bubbles from entering the 
RSA where it could mix with hydrogen gas.  Once the feed water is clear of oxygen bubbles, the three-way valve is 
repositioned to allow water flow into the RSA.  The system is protected from waste water back flow by  physical 
and microbial check valves. 
After eight years of operation, gas bubbles in the feed water have been detected occasionally.  There are six 
known events (8/21/09, 11/14/09, 4/14/10, 12/19/13, 7/30/14, 8/12/14) where the feed water was diverted to the 
wastewater bus due to gas detected in the feed water.  On 12/19/13, oxygen gas was detected in the feed water and 
allowed to go into the RSA (because the gas was detected 
downstream of the 3-way valve, it was not possible to send 
this oxygen bubble to the wastewater bus).  After this 
event, the OGA continued to operate nominally. 
If the wastewater interface were to be deleted from a 
future design, oxygen bubbles from the inlet deionizing 
bed would always be allowed to go into the RSA (where 
there is hydrogen and water) and not be diverted out of the 
system.  There is a concern that there could be a 
deflagration within the RSA. 
To understand the effect of allowing oxygen into the 
RSA, ground testing is proposed for 2015.  A RSA test 
article was manufactured in 2014 and is shown in Figure 
Figure 17 - Recombiner Temperature 
Response to 3.5% H2/O2. 
Figure 18 - RSA Test Article. 
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18.  
The proposed test configuration is shown in 
Figure 19.  The initial test condition of the RSA 
will be as it is on-orbit: filled with the same ratio 
of water and hydrogen.  Next, oxygen will be 
introduced into the RSA.  The oxygen in 
hydrogen mixture will be gradually increased 
from 0% to 100%, changing from the upper 
flammability limit to the lower flammability limit.  
A stoichiometric mixture of hydrogen and oxygen 
within the RSA will be tested.  Cell stack catalyst 
will be introduced into the RSA, since there is a 
concern that the catalyst could shed from the cell 
stack and collect in the RSA where it could 
promote an ignition.  The RSA will be monitored 
for signs of deflagration throughout the test 
period.  In the event that no ignition occurs, a 
stoichiometric mixture of hydrogen and oxygen 
(along with water) in the RSA will be purposely 
ignited to determine the structural capability of 
the RSA. 
If it can be shown that a detonation in the RSA is not credible when oxygen bubbles are allowed in from the feed 
water, then the wastewater interface will be deleted from the design. 
 
H. Replacing the Hydrogen Dome with a Shroud 
The ISS OGA hydrogen dome encloses all hydrogen containing components: cell stack, RSA, valves, sensors 
and connecting tubing.  The dome is connected to space vacuum and is maintained at a vacuum.  The purpose of the 
dome is to detect hydrogen leakage out of the cell stack or RSA (via a pressure rise in the dome), contain hydrogen 
leakage and contain any possible 
detonation event. 
There are commercial and military cell 
stacks that operate safely for thousands of 
hours without a dome.  During ground 
testing, the ISS OGA cell stacks are 
regularly operated safely without a dome.  
The dome was incorporated into the ISS 
OGA design out of an abundance of safety 
conservatism.  The disadvantage of the 
dome is that the internal components (cell 
stack, RSA, valves, sensors, etc.) are 
inaccessible to the crew for maintenance.  
If one of the components fails (such as a 
valve), the entire dome assembly (275 lb) 
will need to be replaced. In over eight 
years of operation on ISS and on the 
ground, no external leakage out of the cell 
stack or RSA has occurred. 
A removable shroud concept is 
proposed as a replacement to the dome for 
the dev OGA in 2015.  The concept is depicted in Figure 20.  Air, at a flow rate of 240 lpm, is forced over the cell 
stack and RSA.  This air is then routed through a hydrogen sensor and recombiner.  Hydrogen leakage will be 
detected via a temperature increase of the recombiner catalyst and the hydrogen sensor reading and the system will 
be safely shut down.  The air flow rate is high enough so that even at the maximum hydrogen leakage rate (out of 
the cell stack or RSA), the mixture is below the lower flammability limit of 4%. Therefore, the shroud configuration 
still allows for external leakage detection while allowing crew maintenance of the internal components.  Analysis 
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Figure 19 - RSA Test Schematic. 
Figure 20 - Shroud Configuration. 
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and testing is proposed for 2015 to show that the cell stack and RSA will not credibly support an internal detonation 
that would lead to accelerated shrapnel that could be a crew hazard.  Liquid water will also likely leak, along with 
the hydrogen.  The effect of water possibly being ingested by the recombiner will need to be analyzed. 
 
I. Downsizing the Power Supply Module (PSM) 
The ISS OGA PSM is a constant current power 
supply for the cell stack.  It is able to provide over 
3800 Watts of power for electrolysis.  The PSM is a 
modular design, containing 4 power converter units 
along with filter boards, control board, relay, etc. The 
internal configuration is shown in Figure 21.  The 
PSM has a weight of 100 lb. 
Since the oxygen production rate for a future OGA 
system will likely be less than one half of that of the 
ISS OGA, the output current of a future PSM design 
can be reduced by at least one half. A redesigned PSM 
could have two of the four power converters removed 
for weight savings (of about 30 lb).  The remaining 
boards could be reoriented parallel to the converters 
for volume savings.  Currently, there is no funding 
available to redesign the PSM in 2015. 
 
VI. Proposed Next Generation OGA Architecture 
A proposed schematic for a 
next generation OGA is shown 
in Figure 22.  The ISS OGA 
design is used as the basis, but 
with certain improvements 
incorporated.  The system 
includes a 28-cell stack with 
chemically stabilized Nafion 
membrane material.  The 
cathode feed configuration is 
retained, along with the RSA.  
No nitrogen purging or 
wastewater interface is 
included.  A recombiner is 
shown in the oxygen outlet.  A 
shroud with forced air flow over 
the cell stack and RSA is shown 
as a replacement to the vacuum 
dome.  This air flow is routed 
through a recombiner for leak 
detection.   By the end of 2015, 
the dev-OGA will be configured 
as shown in the proposed 
schematic.  Subsequently, the 
upgrades will be proposed for incorporation into the ISS OGA. Deleting the nitrogen purge and the wastewater 
interface could be easily implemented in the ISS OGA, with software changes and without launching new hardware.  
The other upgrades can be implemented, but would require the launching of new hardware. 
 
 
Figure 21 - PSM Internal Configuration. 
Figure 22 - Proposed Schematic for a Future OGA. 
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